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Abstract: In his Lectures on Biopolitics (1978-79) Foucault highlighted 
the contemporary intensification of neoliberal arts of government, by 
which economic incentive structures are designed to control human 
behaviour and ‘life itself ’ through market transactions framed as 
enhancing efficiency in the distribution of goods and bads. The human 
subject of this ‘truth game of the market’ seems critically disempowered: 
conceived as a machine-like agent, responding predictably to expert 
manipulations constructing a governmentality that simultaneously 
disavows the amplifications of inequity and ecological damage with which 
it is associated. In the last works of his life, especially The Hermeneutics of 
the Subject (1981-82) and The Courage of Truth (1983-84), Foucault turned 
again towards the possibility of seeking other rules of subjectification so 
as to play the games of power ‘with as little domination as possible’. His 
encouragement was to remember the philosophical strategy associated 
with Socrates, namely to attend to oneself through activating the soul’s 
contemplation of the actions of the self: thereby composing an ethical 
subject whose actions, through practices of freedom and truth-telling, 
are not enslaved by appetites; and whose ethos of care becomes extended 
through the conduct of relationships with others, including life (bios) itself. 
This paper extends Foucault’s expositions on ‘the care of the self ’ and ‘the 
courage of truth’ to affirm animist and affective activations of the soul 
silenced through the consolidated colonial universality of so-called western 
knowledge. In doing so, the paper advocates a refraction of the games of 
truth infusing practices of domination in socio-ecological relations and 
‘biodiversity conservation’, as a gesture towards amplifying an ethics of 
consideration for both human and beyond-human others. 
Keywords Foucault, affect, animism, ethics, governmentality, subjectivity, 
freedom, ontology, biodiversity conservation
 … and here we come back again to that forgotten, outcast word, the soul.1 
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INTRODUCTION: ON THE SEVERING OF SOUL FROM 
LIFE-BEYOND-THE-HUMAN
It has become common to locate an origin myth for contemporary 
environmental problems in the conceptual severing of mind from body, 
and culture from nature, characterising the reclamation of classical thought 
that precipitated the European Enlightenment.2 Part and parcel of this 
mode of thought was a rigorous removal of soul from beyond-human life. 
Cartesian ontology stripped living creatures of the presence of soul so as 
to make humans exceptional in these terms, creating pacified objects and 
automata of beyond-human others.3 This is an ontological move that is both 
a way of knowing and of making the world, in the sense that animals and 
other entities that become conceived as soulless objects are thereby also 
treated and performed as such.4 Extending the hierarchies of soul distilled 
by Plato and then Aristotle,5 Descartes extracted soul from beyond-human 
entities,6 such that life became effectively lifeless: conceived and thereby 
enacted as passive and predictably machine-like, yet also morally in need 
of correction and subjugation.7 Variously dispossessed of the capacities of 
movement, perception, communication and self-directed telos, and thus 
usefully backgrounded as existing only for the instrumental ends of humans, 
beyond-human life became stilled and desacralised as the objects of human 
art and in(ter)vention.8 
 Somewhat paradoxically, much rhetoric and practice in contemporary 
environmental conservation reproduces the pacifying, objectifying, and 
ultimately mechanising orientation described above. Notwithstanding 
designations of ‘wildness’ and ‘rewilding’ as space-making strategies for the 
immanent and self-willed liveliness of diverse beyond-human natures, the 
sequestration of conserved, viewed and hunted ‘wild natures’ can reproduce 
rather than refract the relational and affective alienations between human 
and other-than-human natures associated with the modern era.9 Indeed, new 
conservation technologies such as biodiversity offsetting have invigorated 
mechanistic approaches to natures-beyond-the-human in recent years. In 
biodiversity offsetting technologies, for example, the relational field of nature 
becomes disaggregated into discrete units whose subtraction and addition can 
seemingly engender improvements in an ‘aggregate bottom line’ (termed ‘net 
gain’ or ‘no let loss’ of biodiversity), even though losses through development-
associated transformations have occurred.10 
 The severing of soul from a machine-like nature and the dominance over 
embodied life this severance makes possible is, however, only one variety 
of past thinking and practices that may inform present relationships with 
natures-beyond-the-human. In this essay I extend prior engagement that 
mobilises the work of philosopher Michel Foucault to offer clarity regarding 
the neoliberal ‘arts of government’ structuring much recent and current 
environmental conservation work.11 I draw on later works by Foucault which 
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encourage, in perhaps surprising ways, creative reconsiderations of practices 
of attending to self and other through both an expanded consideration of 
‘soul’ (psūkhe) and an encouragement to tend to ‘the self ’ so as ultimately 
to also attend well to others and to ‘life itself ’ (bios).12 The latter dimension 
is, of course, clearly relevant to the goals of contemporary ‘biodiversity 
conservation’. In the extraordinarily generous meditation on the nature 
and practice of truth that constitutes Foucault’s final lecture series delivered 
in 1983-1984,13 Foucault extends his earlier work on the care of the self,14 
to ultimately frame care of the self as both care of the soul and care of 
bios – of embodied life. Such a focus seems critically relevant for societal 
understandings of practices that engender the care – epimeleia – for beyond-
human others that constitutes a core concern of environmental conservation 
and care.15 Instead, an intensification of fragmented selves, overwhelm, 
addiction, self-blame, self-harm and narcissism arguably characterises the 
contemporary moment, linking the atomising zeitgeist of neoliberalism with 
a contradictory lack of care of the self that extends into a brutal lack of care 
for human and beyond-human others.16
 I open the following commentary, then, by re-thinking the notion of 
‘soul’ in considering an expanded exploration of care of the self. I then move 
to propose that a ‘bioecoethics’ that encourages care for others, including 
the multiplicitous others constituting life itself, is central to this expanded 
conception of care of the self. Both these moves – a (re-)emphasis on a 
metaphysics of soul in care of the self, and an explicit understanding that 
care of the self includes care for others as well as care for life itself – draw me 
(again) towards observations of the resonance between such ethical reflections 
and animist arts of conduct.17 Animist practices of existence emerge at least 
in part through an assumption of soul as the hypostatis of existence, and not 
limited therefore to exceptional humans.18 In combination with perceptions 
and experiences of distributed agency in beyond-human entities, diverse 
other-than-human natures thereby become folded into moral economies 
of representation, choice, action, sharing and predation that are not solely 
human.19 These perceptions and practices, and specifically the curtailment 
of appetites and accumulations they can effect, may emphasise affective and 
pragmatic modes of existence that constitute and work for an abundant and 
relatively egalitarian ethics and aesthetics of life itself. 
 Beyond these more general possibilities, the observations outlined above 
are relevant for pragmatic environmental, and specifically ‘biodiversity’, 
conservation endeavours for two additional reasons. First, because there 
is a correspondence between contemporary cultures that might loosely be 
described as animist and the territories of so-called ‘biodiversity hotspots’ 
globally.20 Secondly, because territorial threats to such cultures are associated 
at least in part with the establishment and policing of protected areas.21 In my 
concluding section I thus draw attention to ‘the courage of truth’ currently 
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of existence and of caring, given the apparent status of these practices 
as ‘falsehoods’ to be excluded in modern rationality and truth regimes. 
Throughout the essay, and after Eduardo Kohn in How Forests Think: Towards 
an Anthropology of Nature Beyond the Human, I use the terms ‘beyond-human 
life’, ‘beyond-human nature(s)’ and ‘natures-beyond-the-human’ as a way of 
signalling that humans are both part of the organic and inorganic materialities 
comprising the world and exist in diverse relationships with the multiplicitous 
differences in entities and processes comprising this world.22 As encouraged 
by David Abram in The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-
Than-Human World, I avoid the term ‘nonhuman nature’ due to its defining 
of natures-beyond-the-human in negative terms, i.e. as ‘not human’.23
 
RE-THINKING SOUL IN EXTENDING CARE OF THE SELF
 So I turn myself to face me.24 
One of the keys of classical Greek thought seems to be an understanding 
of ‘soul’, psūkhe as ontologically distinct from ‘the body’. As recovered in 
detail in various works by Michel Foucault, it is this soul that is able to 
contemplate the actions of the self, and thus to be mobilised or activated so 
as to foster practices of freedom, i.e. of will, that exercise labour on oneself 
in the form of care of the self. The implication is that the subject that turns 
round to the self and that attends to (cares for) oneself will ultimately also 
practice relations of power (arts of conduct) that tend towards freedom for 
all, because they practice freedom in the mastery of appetites (Hermeneutics, 
pp1, 206).25 
 From a dialogue attributed to Plato between Socrates and a young man 
(Alcibiades) about to enter public life, Foucault summarises care of the self as 
‘a mode of knowledge of self which had the form of the soul’s contemplation 
of itself and its recognition of its mode of being’ (Courage of Truth, p159). Care 
of the self initially means ‘[t]urning one’s gaze on the self … [and] turning it 
away from others first of all. And then, later, it means turning it away from 
the things of the world’ (Hermeneutics, p218). Indeed, ‘all is lost if you begin 
with care of others’ rather than of the self (p198). In the precept and set of 
practices of care of the self in ancient philosophical and moral life: 
the establishment of oneself as a reality ontologically distinct from the 
body, in the form of a psūkhe which possesses the possibility and ethical duty 
of contemplating itself, gives rise to a mode of truth-telling, of veridiction, 
the role and end of which is to lead the soul back to its mode of being and its 
world (Courage of Truth, pp159-160, emphasis added).
Care of the self is additionally identified as ‘the principle that taking care of 
the soul is, for the soul, to contemplate itself and, in doing so, to re-cognise 
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[i.e. connect with] the divine element which is precisely what enables it to see the 
truth’ (p126, emphasis added). For Socrates, ‘the soul must look at itself … 
it is like an eye which, seeking to see itself, is forced to look into the pupil of 
another eye in order to see itself, [through which] by contemplating the divine 
reality, we can grasp what is divine in our own soul’(p159). 
 For Socrates, then, the soul able to contemplate ‘itself ’ is both ‘relational’ 
and ‘divine’. Indeed, care of the self, which is also constituted as care of 
one’s soul, ‘calls for a number of operations by which the subject must purify 
himself [through arts of catharsis] and become, in his own nature, able to have 
contact with and to recognise the divine element within him’ (Hermeneutics, 
pp173, 176). Through the encouraged presence of a listening other, care 
of one’s soul was thereby conceived by the classical Greeks as imbricated 
with other selves so as to be(come) both polyvalent and dialogic rather than 
atomised and individualistic (Courage of Truth, p6). Both knowing yourself 
(gnōthi seauton) and caring for yourself (epimeleia heautou) were placed at the 
centre of human community: ‘you must attend to yourself, you must not forget 
yourself, you must take care of yourself ’, as well as ‘encouraging others to 
attend to themselves’ (Hermeneutics, pp3-5).
 Let us pause for a moment on the possibility of seeing what is divine in an 
other, in order to get a grip on ‘what is divine in our own soul’. The notion 
of soul is variously associated with breath and brightness: with a relaxed 
inner light – ‘the light, which at the same time is the source of being’(p216) 
whose élan vital engenders ‘a feeling of participation in a flowing onward’ in 
the sonorous reverberations of existence.26 In ancient and classical times, the 
soul that flourished amplified eudaimonia overall. Associated with the goddess 
of happiness and prosperity, the term eudaimonia is comprised of words for 
‘good’ or ‘harmony’ combined with ‘soul’. Embodying eudaimonia in the time 
of Socrates thus literally denoted living in such a way that (one’s) soul is 
nourished. A life lived well and harmoniously was thereby framed in terms of 
‘a good of the soul – not a material or bodily good such as wealth or political 
power’.27 Eudaimonia remains a key term today in the philosophical domain 
of virtue ethics: the branch of philosophy inspired by the classical Greeks that 
considers what it means, and what is required, to live ‘a good life’.28 Perhaps 
more familiarly, it appears in translation as the vegetal, generative term 
‘flourishing’, a concept central to a number of recent texts concerned with 
possibilities for caring entanglements of human with other-than-human 
lives.29 
 This brief detour around conceptions of eudaimonia gestures towards ways 
in which Socrates’ encouragements to take care of the self through taking care 
of the soul (as invoked in Foucault’s later work) were themselves connected 
with a milieu of past conceptions, practices and usages. As Foucault writes, the 
‘modes of valuation and generally accepted attitudes’ of the classical Greek 
situation were themselves ‘evidence of a rather widespread moral tradition, 
which was doubtless rather deeply rooted in the past’ (Care of the Self, p9). 
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 Two elements of these deep roots are worth mentioning here. One is 
the observation that the latter part of the term eudaimonia also referred to 
a prior and co-existing conception in the mythology of ancient Greece of 
‘daemons’ as ‘benign supernatural beings’ associated simultaneously with 
beyond-human nature and ‘an individual’s personal spirit’ or ‘soul’.30 To 
live well, i.e. to experience happiness as a result of living a harmonious 
life, was thus rooted in an older embrace of the communicative guidance of 
spirited agencies of nature. This (especially Pythagorean) embrace entailed 
an understanding that other kinds of being were also animated by a daemon 
(daimōn) or spirited soul, whose nourishment also made it possible for those 
beings to live well.31 ‘Flourishing’ in these older expressions of a multifaceted 
eudaimonia or harmonious soul thereby connects with an animistic conception 
and experience of soul as distributed through diverse manifestations of 
existence (discussed further below), inviting daily lived practices of empathic 
‘co-participation’ to amplify possibilities for the co-sustenance of varied 
bodies and materialities.32 These beyond-human aspects have been almost 
completely written-out of later conceptions of eudaimonia as specifically human 
flourishing, although a resurgence of ‘the acknowledged virtues of ecological 
dependence’ is also noticeable.33 A second ‘deep root’ links classical Greek 
practices associated with the soul contemplating itself so as to care for the 
self, with older established techniques of care including the interpretation 
of dreams as acts of and on the soul which is in connection with a world 
beyond the self (Care of the Self, p10). These conceptions and techniques 
are themselves embedded in a longstanding milieu of practices that might 
be termed ‘shamanic arts of the soul’,34 connected additionally with animist 
ontologies of being.35 
 Returning to the resurgence of classical Greek thought, ethics and 
aesthetics that accompanied the European Enlightenment, the passions and 
practices of the soul again received great attention in this Cartesian moment 
(Passions). Descartes, however, seems to differ from the classical Greeks by 
conceiving of the soul ‘as in a very real sense joined to the whole of the body’ 
(via the pineal gland), whilst also emphasising the possibility of actions of 
the will in attaining mastery over the soul’s ‘passions’ (p207). In combination 
with the shift towards the cogito – ‘I think therefore I am’ – a new impetus was 
ushered in, however, through which ‘the condition for the subject’s access to 
the truth is knowledge (connaissance)’ that can be indefinitely accumulated via 
individualised trajectories and is relatively unmoored from earlier conceptions 
and practices of care (Hermeneutics, pp17-18). As Foucault puts it, this impetus 
then becomes a ‘modern elimination of care of the self in favour of self-
knowledge’ (p1). Combined with the severing of soul from beyond-human 
life (as noted in the opening section), the cogito arguably plays a key role in 
sanctioning an individualistic mode of knowledge accumulation that exceeds 
and displaces the care for others effected through older practices of care of 
the self. 
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 Foucault claims further that in these older practices of care of the self 
ultimately ‘what is designated as the object one must take care of is not the 
soul, it is life (bios), that is to say the way of living’ (Courage of Truth, pp126-
127). This point seems to be of critical relevance in the contemporary moment, 
shaped as it is by the extinction of myriad forms of life. It leads Foucault to ask: 
‘what in the way of ethics and rules of conduct follows from this ontological 
foundation of … being’ constituted by care of the self? (p160). I consider this 
question in the following section.
CARE FOR THE SELF AS BIOECOETHICAL PRACTICE
In his Lectures on Biopolitics (1978-1979), Foucault highlights the contemporary 
intensification of neoliberal arts of government by which economic incentive 
structures are designed to control human behaviour and ‘life itself ’ through 
market transactions framed as enhancing efficiency in the distribution of 
goods and bads.36 For Foucault, ‘arts of government’ as ‘governmentality’ 
were not effected solely through top-down institutions and policies of 
government, but instead were generated through multiplicitous, dynamic and 
distributed technical work and discourses. This is the ‘conduct of conduct’ 
of heterogenous ‘discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions’, that also sediments into particular 
and empowered institutional apparatuses or dispositifs.37
 In a much-cited article in Conservation and Society drawing on Foucaultian 
understandings of neoliberal arts of governance, Robert Fletcher summarises 
neoliberalism as thoroughly imbricated in conservation policy and practice 
through: 
1) the creation of capitalist markets for natural resource exchange and 
consumption; 2) privatisation of resource control within these markets; 3) 
commodification of resources so that they can be traded within markets; 
4) withdrawal of direct government intervention from market transactions 
[whilst maintaining continual vigilance in relation to the maintenance of 
market structures and conditions]; and 5) decentralisation of resource 
governance to local authorities and non-state actors such as non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) (Neoliberal environmentality, p172).38 
Neoliberal environmentality through conservation thus endeavours ‘to 
provide [market-based] incentives sufficient to motivate individuals to choose 
to behave in conservation-friendly ways’ (p176). The human subject of this 
‘truth game of the market’, however, seems critically disempowered: conceived 
as an individualised machine-like agent that responds predictably to expert 
manipulations engendering a capitalist governmentality that paradoxically 
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with which it is associated. Indeed, Pignarre and Stengers describe this 
disempowering ‘hold’ by capitalism over the ‘agents’ that loyally perform 
its depoliticised and naturalised fabrications as ‘sorcery’, arguing that to 
understand this hold ‘we must turn towards knowledges that have been 
disqualified’.39 
 In the last works of his life, especially his lecture series The Hermeneutics of 
the Subject (1981-1982) and The Courage of Truth (1983-1984), Foucault turned 
again towards the possibility of seeking other rules of subjectification so as to 
play the games of power ‘with as little domination as possible’ (Concern of the 
Self, p298). His encouragement, as highlighted in the preceding section, is 
to remember the philosophical strategy associated with Socrates, namely to 
attend to oneself so as to care for oneself and, through this attention, to care for 
others and for life itself. By the means of this ‘continuous concern throughout 
life’ (Hermeneutics, p8) an ethical subject would thereby be composed 
whose actions, through practices of freedom and of truth-telling, are not 
enslaved by appetites, and whose ethos of care becomes extended through 
the conduct of relationships with others, including life (bios) itself. Care of 
the self is again affirmed as the opposite of an atomising philosophy or set 
of practices. Instead, care of the self ‘is an attitude towards the self, others, 
and the world’ comprising ‘a certain form of attention’ that will ‘produce or 
induce behaviour through which one will actually be able to care for others’ 
(Hermeneutics, pp10, 174, 198, 202). This understanding is clarified in the 
following statements: ‘[t]he practice of the self links up with social practice or, 
if you like, the formation of a relationship of the self to the self quite clearly 
connects up with the relationship of the self to the Other … [to constitute 
social relationships that] involve soul service as a dimension’ (pp155-6); and 
‘[g]iving an account of oneself [... leads us] to bios, to life, to existence and 
the way in which one conducts this existence’ (Courage of Truth, p160).
 The congruence of one’s mode of existence with one’s (care of the) self 
thereby engenders an additional congruence with the care of life (bios) more 
broadly (p149). In Foucault’s analysis, then, gnōthi seauton – ‘know thyself ’ – 
‘is valid both for the discovery of the soul and for bringing the problem of 
the bios to light’, although different self-knowledges may arise depending on 
which form (of psūkhe / metaphysics and bios) the enquiry of gnōthi seauton is 
indexically linked to (p160). Whilst both ‘the discovery of the soul’ and the 
‘problem of bios’ work towards an ‘aesthetics of existence’ (p162), it is the 
latter – namely ‘bringing the problem of bios to light’ – that approaches and 
constitutes existence (bios) specifically ‘as an aesthetic object, as an object of 
aesthetic elaboration and perception’: or ‘bios as a beautiful work’(p162). In 
this dimension of gnōthi seauton, then, ‘a metaphysics of the soul’ and ‘an 
aesthetics of life’(p160) may become congruent in a ‘stylistics of existence’ 
that affirms ‘life as possible beauty’(p164).
 For Socrates and especially the Cynics (see below), a life of possible 
beauty was also a philosophical life that cared for ‘reason, truth and the 
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constant improvement of your soul’ (Hermeneutics, p6). Importantly, such a 
life was in contradistinction with one in which all one’s ‘care’ was devoted 
to ‘wealth, reputation and honors’(p6). Indeed, a lack of care of the self was 
understood to lead to an excess of ‘the legitimate exercise of one’s power’ 
and an imposition of ‘one’s fantasies, appetites, and desires on others’: as 
exhibited by ‘the rich and powerful man who uses his wealth and power to 
abuse others, to impose an unwarranted power on them’ (Concern of the Self, 
p288). Such a man is in fact ‘the slave of his appetites’, unable to regulate 
his power over others (p288). Later, Aristotle similarly proposed a moral 
opposition between the chrematistic wealth associated with money-making 
and the natural or householding economy (oikos), claiming the former to be 
intrinsically destructive of the latter’s ‘reciprocal interplay of natural forces 
that are responsible for production and growth’ (The Devil, p133). 
 For Socrates, then, ‘the greatest service’ he could perform was to try to 
persuade the wealthy Athenian élite ‘to care less about his property than 
about himself so as to make himself as excellent and reasonable as possible, 
to consider less the things of the city than the city itself, in short to apply 
these same principles to everything’ (Hermeneutics, p7). The neoliberal 
rational actor today is instead encouraged to manifest ‘her/his own self-
interest through enterprise and competition for maximum profit’, a tendency 
contributing to the extreme plutonomic and kleptocratic concentrations 
of material and financial wealth characterising the contemporary moment 
(Neoliberal governmentality, p174). The individualistic self bolstered by material 
accumulation and narcissistic attention to appearances is thereby in direct 
tension with a care of the self-oriented towards sustaining the truth of justice 
and injustice known by the soul (on which more below), combined with clarity 
of intention and service towards other souls. In this respect, it is paradoxical 
that a great deal of biodiversity conservation effort has become aligned with 
creating neoliberal incentive structures through which individual ‘green’ 
action is stimulated through the promise of financial profit.40
 Foucault himself often invokes a revolutionary mode of existence as both 
‘a political project’ and ‘a form of life’ (Courage of Truth, p183). In his final 
lecture series Foucault dwelt extensively on the ‘philosophical life’ exhibited 
through antagonistic renunciations of material wealth and attachment. 
Embodied in numerous ways by the Cynics, Stoics and Epicureans, Foucault 
sees these practices as revived especially from the nineteenth century onwards 
in what he terms ‘revolutionary subjectivities’ (Hermeneutics, pp154-55, 208).41 
As ‘a mode of living’ rather than an ‘individualistic resort’, the care of the self 
thus appears as ‘an intensification of social relations’ extending an ethos of care 
through the conduct of relationships with others, including life (bios) itself 
(Hermeneutics, pp23, 53, emphasis added). What I want to suggest, then, is 
that care of the self, in the terms recovered and elaborated by Foucault, may 
simultaneously ‘repotentialise the world’ through an intensification of eco-
social relations and eco-ethical practices of care (Fairy Dust, p190). Eco-social 
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intensifications associated with care of self and others are also resonant with 
animistic ontologies, relationalities and arts of conduct. It is to these arts that 
I turn in the following section. 
ANIMIST AND AFFECTIVE ACTIVATIONS OF SOUL
In order to know other cultures – non-western cultures, so-called primitive 
cultures – in order to know these cultures, we must no doubt have had not 
only to marginalize them, not only to look down upon them, but also to 
exploit them, to conquer them and in some way through violence to keep 
them silent. … So, if you will, my hypothesis is this: the universality of 
our knowledge has been acquired at the cost of exclusions, bans, denials, 
rejections, at the price of a kind of cruelty with regard to reality.42
 
In Foucault’s schema of power, the exercise of strategic power relations 
between individuals becomes extended through techniques of government 
into distinct governmentalities. These techniques can become states of 
domination when truth-games of the subject favour mastery over others, 
rather than self-mastery. Nonetheless, and as articulated above, there is 
already divergence in the classical world regarding what should really be a 
focus of this care of the self that also constitutes a care of the soul, affirming 
that metaphysical frameworks can give rise to different regimes of truth and 
modes of existence that may become antagonistic (Courage of Truth, p164). 
It is an individual’s soul – psūkhe – that is capable of ‘ethical differentiation’ 
(p61), yet from Plato onwards a divergence also appears in what becomes 
the focus of care of the self through its contemplation by the soul (pp126-
127). As delineated above, one important thread is a chain of connection 
between caring for others and for bios – life itself – and caring for one’s soul 
through care of the self. This thread of connection aligns with a Foucaultian 
expression of ‘biopower’ as the exercise of power in the interest of nurturing 
and sustaining ‘life’ (Neoliberal Governmentality, p178). 
 At the same time, these delineations are unclear on the nature of this ‘life 
itself ’. In response, I affirm two possible sets of correspondences. First, is a 
metaphysics of the soul that entwines ancient conceptualisations of eudaimonia 
(harmonious soul) involving an ontology of the soul as constituting the divine 
within able to recognise itself, with an understanding of soul as simultaneously 
animating the spirited agencies of nature, and whose nourishment made 
it possible for those beings to also live well. As mentioned above, ‘soul’ in 
this metaphysics becomes something like a possible perceptual hypostasis 
of existence, inviting co-participation and reciprocal care by human selves. 
Second, is an understanding of biopower as the exercise of power so as 
to nurture and sustain ‘life’ itself. Following these conceptualisations and 
correspondences towards a new ‘art of government’ (p178) or ‘conduct of 
conduct’, might it be possible to conceive and constitute something like an 
42. Foucault 
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‘animist biopower’ through which animist ontologies of being combine with 
ethical capacities for ‘living intimately with other souls’ in the nurturing and 
sustenance of life itself? (Poetics of Space, p27). 
 I have suggested that political (re)activations of the power-full ‘anti-power’ 
of animist arts of conduct, aesthetics and co-participation might offer critical 
refractions of the simultaneously excessive and deadening limitations and 
exploitations of capitalist ‘world ecology’.43 Humans everywhere clearly are 
dependent through pragmatic predations on the ecology of selves amongst 
which we live. Animist ontologies, however, tend to extend radically beyond 
these pragmatic relationships into relational dimensions beyond-the-human 
that encourage care (epimeleia) as a field of practices towards self, others and 
souls. Affect – the mobilisation of feeling and emotion – is critical to this care. 
In so-called animist contexts, practices of care thus frequently deploy what 
Jerome Lewis refers to as ‘technologies of enchantment’.44 These technologies 
affirm relationships between human and varied beyond-human others as 
simultaneously affective, aesthetic and moral, each dimension requiring 
care-full and differentiated forms of attention. 
 These skills, liberated through transforming exercises of the self on 
the self with the support of varied human and beyond-human others, 
encourage the ‘significance of human interventions’ in a perceptual context 
of a communicative more-than-human world asserting multiple kinds of 
agency.45 Socioecologies thereby are known to be ‘mutually constituted 
through processes of active, participative and affective relationships with 
landscapes and non-human species’ (Elephant, p120). Specifically, through 
making and experiencing intricate and intimate ‘technologies’ of song, 
music, rhythm, dance, stories and attire, an array of connecting and caring 
affects may be stimulated with ‘power-effects’ in terms of the outcomes of 
engagement with the multifaceted embodiments of life itself. These effective 
affects include aesthetic appreciation, senses of delight, wonder and mystery, 
perceptual opening to the presence and forms of spirit-beings, and varied 
potent experiences of challenge, joy and trickery in connection with entities 
beyond-the-self.46 
 To provide an example, separately enacted songs-dances that are part 
of a diverse, dynamic and strictly organised Ju|’hoan musical heritage 
repertoire in north-east Namibia are connected with a diversity of specific 
and polysemous potent entities encountered and variously consumed in San 
everyday and symbolic life.47 These highly technical musical sets, distinguished 
through rhythmic arrangements clapped by women, constitute ‘songs invested 
with supernatural energy’ (n|om tzísì). N|om tzísì songs connect with and 
evoke a diversity of ‘beyond-human’ entities and their culturally-inflected 
associations: ‘elephant’, ‘giraffe’, ‘honey’, ‘wind’, ‘hyena’, ‘oryx’, ‘rain’, 
‘porcupine’, ‘eland’, ‘water’, ‘kudu’, ‘wildebeest’, ‘buffalo’, ‘duiker’, ‘aardvark’, 
‘springhare’, ‘scorpion’, ‘mamba’, ‘python’, ‘puffadder’, ‘g|úí bird’, ‘giant 
eagle owl’, ‘grass’, ‘python’, ‘lion’, ‘g!ú!óbo snake’, ‘g||àqrà plant’, ‘mangetti 
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tree’, ‘spider’, ‘stone chat’, ‘tortoise’, ‘buffalo’, ‘duiker’ and ‘mouse’, to name 
some of these lively entities (Ju|’hoan Musical Heritage, pp12-14, 17, 19, 26). 
 These song-dances and the healing possibilities they effect are infused with 
cultural imaginaries and experiential affects that connect people, diversely 
embodied natural and supernatural entities, ancestors/spirits of the dead, 
and primal time sensitivities – the latter emphasising cultural affirmations 
of a time when humans and animals had not been separated by language.48 
In ‘giraffe songs’, for example, the essence of ‘giraffe’ is invoked since this 
animal ‘is considered to possess the most powerful supernatural energy, 
with the help of which shamans may go the most easily into a trance and 
exercise their healing power effectively’ (Ju|’hoan Musical Heritage, p26). In 
other contexts a healer may affectively become a lion or other animal so as 
to travel more quickly beyond the physical body to the home of the great 
God where ‘the souls of the sick’ may be rescued (Healing Makes Our Hearts 
Happy, pp24-25). ‘Healing’ or curing in the context of San and Khoe medicine 
dances is enabled by combinations of complex and driving polyphonic vocal 
and clapped rhythms and rhythmic dancing, embedded within ritualised 
knowledges, practices and values regarding entities, hunting, gender, and 
significant life history transitions, all of which require stringent and sometimes 
fearful technologies of the self in correspondence with human and beyond-
human others.49 In combination, these actions and associations enable 
affective intensities that move both individual healers and the participating 
community into transformed states of perceptual awareness and attention 
that permit the application of techniques needed for healing to occur. 
 Anthropologist Jerome Lewis similarly describes the effects and affects of 
an array of ‘spirit-plays’ performed by the spectrum of BaYaka peoples who 
for millennia have inhabited the forested areas of central and west Africa: 
Each spirit-play contributes to an economy of joy – a system of distributing 
practices and knowledge that ensure particular euphoric states are 
repeatedly produced and available to all present. … Each spirit-play has its 
own characteristic style that creates a different quality of joyful experience. 
During the total darkness of no-moon Malobe, for instance, fires are put out 
and torches forbidden, participants huddle together in the middle of camp 
with their legs resting on their neighbours’, and their voices intertwine in 
a complex polyphony until tiny luminous dots float into camp producing 
a calm, wondrous and expansive joy. In the pitch-black participants melt 
into one another and the forest (Where Goods are Free, p7). 
These varied BaYaka rituals ‘seduce non-physical entities (spirits) from the 
forest in order to establish something non-physical (spirit) in the sense of 
an uplifting or joyful atmosphere’ that ‘people, animals and the forest will 
feel’(p8). Skill and intention is deployed so as ‘to enchant many senses’, ‘using 
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and parody, touch and smell, emotions and desires, … trance and overlapping 
percussive rhythms’(p8). Through building enthusiasm amongst participants, 
‘the music takes on a life of its own’ so as to reach ‘astounding synchronicity’ 
between singers, engendering euphoric experiences of connections between 
people, spirits and forest (p15). On a different continent entirely, Amazonian 
shamans deploy the singing of delicate spirit-songs known widely as icaros that 
are taught to healers especially by plant spirits. In conjunction with potent 
psychoactive plant technologies, icaros are sung so as to attain a focused 
perceptual openness in which forest spirit-beings can be seen, communicated 
with and sometimes contested, and sicknesses can be seen and healed.50 
 The exuberantly directed arts of enchantment, potency and healing 
described above seem less like ‘care-work’ or ‘affective labor’51 than perhaps 
arising through an immanent concern of ‘the self ’ to become pragmatically 
and aesthetically resonant with what is already musical – or harmonious – in 
nature.52 Foucault himself alludes directly to such resonance in meditating 
on the possibility of connections between the Greek roots of mel (care, cf. 
epimeleia) and melos (melody, song, rhythmic singing, music): thus ‘[t]here 
would be something like a musical secret, a secret of the musical appeal in 
this notion of care’ (Courage of Truth, pp118-119). Indeed, the possibility 
of individuals acting ‘musically’ together in the dance of multispecies 
socioecologies inspires anthropologist Anna Tsing to assert that ‘we should be 
studying polyphonic assemblages, gatherings of ways of being’ in salvaging 
life from capitalist ruins.53
 All these care-full technologies of potency can only be enacted through 
technical training and skill in arts of ‘the self ’. By enabling experiential 
practices of joy, enchantment and participation in connection with the agencies 
of beyond-human souls, these skills and techniques act to entwine human 
being, desire and imagination with the interests of an ecology of selves-beyond-
the-human so as to ensure the continuity and sustenance of all. Ecological 
relations thus indeed are enacted as multifaceted social relations, through 
which the objectification and instrumentalisation of other-than-human entities 
is attenuated. As Neera Singh affirms, such affects and associated practices may 
assist with moving away from framing conservation ‘as a burdensome activity 
that entails sacrifice and costs alone’, to amplify instead ‘the joyful and life-
affirming aspects of conservation care labor and its transformative potential’.54 
In indigenous contexts, egalitarian socioecological relations may be additionally 
nourished through societal constraints on both material accumulation and 
consolidations of political authority and domination.55
 The cultures of practice and decentralised acts of conduct gestured 
towards above are associated with landscapes of great conservation value for 
the biodiversity that remains in the company of the pragmatically animist 
cultures that have lived there. It is the modernity of particularly the post-
Cartesian moment that rejects these poetic ‘technologies of enchantment’ 
and the soul though its cruelty towards foreign realities that can only become 
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known once excluded, contained, suppressed, exploited, observed and 
exoticised.56 As Foucault notes in the quote that opens this section, ‘the west’ 
and its universality is asserted precisely through cruelty to the affective and 
ontological conceptions and practices of variously non-capitalist cultures that 
act as checks on human instrumentalisations of beyond-human natures.
 It may seem a far stretch to invoke these other(ed) cultures and arts of 
conduct in a Foucaultian meditation on ancient western technologies of the 
care of the self and of bios, i.e. life itself. But how far is it really? The ancient 
world of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle invoked by Foucault was also a pagan one 
shaped by the actions of a pantheon of gods and goddesses in communicative 
relationships with mortals. Dreams connected the self with worlds beyond the 
self and required interpretation as part of care of the self, as is integral to self-
other care in many cultural contexts. Indeed, the last words of Socrates himself 
were reportedly an exhortation to his followers not to neglect an appropriate 
sacrifice to the god Asclepius who cures humans. This request is interpreted 
by Foucault in two relevant ways. First, as an encouragement not to forget to 
care for the gods whose inescapable benevolence holds us in their care. In an 
interesting echo of an anthropology of ‘original affluence’ and an assumption 
of abundance that mitigates against accumulation,57 Socrates’ last words in 
Foucault’s interpretation are thus an exhortation to his followers not to forget 
that we exist in a metaphysical state of being cared for. Secondly, Foucault interprets 
Socrates’ last words as an encouragement to his followers to remember to give 
thanks for the cure of staying true to the soul’s sense of good and bad, rather 
than to be swayed and corrupted by the opinion of others. 
 For Socrates, the part of us that knows one’s truth is once again the soul: 
the part that is in tune with justice and injustice, good and bad (Courage of 
Truth, p104). It is in following this truth that ‘we will avoid that ruin/destruction 
of the soul caused by [following] the opinion of the crowd’(p105). Here then, 
Foucault, via a meditation on Socrates’ last words, speaks of the courage to 
stay close to the truth known through the soul. Living ethically, including 
‘eco-ethically’, thereby requires the courage of truth. 
TRUTH-TELLING AS AN (ECO)ETHICAL MODE OF EXISTENCE 
SUPPORTING LIFE LIVED BY LIVES
In his final lecture series on The Courage of Truth, Foucault focused on the 
courage required to speak one’s truth truthfully, knowing there may be a 
risk associated with doing this: what the ancient Greeks called parrhēsia in 
contradistinction to the manipulations of one’s audience valued in rhetorical 
skill. Socrates linked ‘greatness of soul’ with the courage required by the 
practice of open-hearted parrhēsia – speaking one’s truth truthfully – even 
when this speaking may carry the risk of alienating one’s interlocuters, 
perhaps precipitating violent reactions to this truth (p12). In speaking of 
the courage of Socrates’ truth-telling (parrhēsia) in the face of his own death, 
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Foucault indelibly entwines truth-telling with mode of life and practices of 
existence (as described above). Following Socrates he asserts, for example, 
that: 
[t]he mode of life appears as the essential, fundamental correlative of the 
practice of truth-telling. Telling the truth in the realm of the care of men 
[sic?] is to question their mode of life, to put this mode to the test and 
define what there is in it that may be ratified and recognized as good and 
what on the other hand must be rejected and condemned. In this you can 
see the fundamental series linking care, parrhēsia (free-spokenness), and 
the ethical division between good and evil in the realm of bios (existence) 
(p149).
This ethical mode of veridiction and of truth-telling is, then, an inescapably 
‘ethical parrhēsia’, ‘[i]ts privileged essential object [being] life and the mode of 
life’ (p149 emphasis added). For Socrates, whose mission was parrhēsia (telling 
one’s truth truthfully and with courage in the face of risk), ‘[i]f we can have 
phronēsis [reason] and take good decisions, this is because we have a particular 
relation to the truth which is founded ontologically in the nature of the soul’ 
(p86). It is the nature of the soul to disaggregate justice and injustice, good 
and bad, and Socrates’ aim is: 
to see to it that people take care of themselves, that each individual attends 
to himself [as] a rational being having a relation to truth founded on the 
very being of his soul. And in this we now have a parrhēsia on the axis 
of ethics. What is at stake in this new form of parrhēsia is the foundation 
of ēthos as the principle on the basis of which conduct can be defined as 
rational conduct in accordance with the very being of the soul (p86).
‘Ethics’ in Foucault’s last works thereby foundationally connects care, life / bios, 
truth, conduct, courage and the soul, to ask ‘[w]hat is the ethical relationship 
between courage and truth? Or, to what extent do the ethics of truth entail 
courage?’ And further, what are ‘the moral conditions which enable a subject 
to have access to the truth and to speak the truth’ (p124). 
 The contemporary moment, characterised as it is by both extreme inequality 
and extreme loss of life’s diversity, presents seemingly insurmountable ethical 
problems. But one thing seems clear. This is that parrhēsia – the courage to 
speak truth (to power) in the course of enacting caring practices of existence 
– is inescapable if one cares for the sustenance of continued human and 
beyond-human diversity. It is thereby a moment that seems to call for: 
militancy as bearing witness by one’s life in the form of a style of existence 
… ensuring that one’s life bears witness, breaks, and has to break with the 
conventions, habits, and values of society [through manifesting] directly, 
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by its visible form, its constant practice, and its immediate existence, the 
concrete possibility and the evident value of an other life, which is the 
true life (p184).
The unbearable weight of the Anthropocene makes it urgent for this radically 
other future life – this life ‘that doesn’t yet exist and about which we cannot 
know how and what it will be’ – to be one that amplifies possibilities for 
structural resonance and mutuality between social, (in)organic and spirited 
diversities of existence (Neoliberal environmentality, p178). The encouragement 
here, then, is to better play and refract the games of truth infusing practices 
of domination in socio-environmental relations so as to amplify care for both 
human and beyond-human others.58 For Foucault, playing the games of truth 
and the games of power with which these are imbricated with as little domination 
as possible requires a care of the self as an ethos of freedom that simultaneously 
limits the concentration of power (Care of the Self, p298). The extension I am 
suggesting here is that animist socialist practices and perceptions of the soul 
and of life itself might energise a ‘post-conservationist’ ‘truth environmentality’ 
that engenders practices of existence that are simultaneously less dominating 
and more affirming of life’s diversity (c.f.Neoliberal environmentality, pp177, 
179). A multiciplicity of illustrations from past and present non-capitalist 
realities are of critical value in puncturing ‘the distortions of humanity that 
are wrought normal by the objective pretensions of the present’ (The Devil, 
p154). In doing so, these contexts offer post-capitalist ‘counter-truths’ towards 
possible, if necessarily different, structural mutualities.
 Foucault contributed his final lecture series on The Courage of Truth in the 
knowledge that his corporeal time on earth was limited. From someone well-
travelled in appetites and capacities for embodied and affective intensities 
that take one beyond the docile, limited self, it seems pertinent and poignant 
that his final works, like Socrates’, were infused with encouragements to live 
a truthful philosophical life characterised by a mastery of appetites and a 
care of the self.59 This essay extends Foucault’s expositions on ‘the care of the 
self ’ and ‘the courage of truth’ as counter-propositions to the incentivised 
and atomised neoliberal agent. The suggestion is that care of the self can 
be understood and mobilised as a re-connecting series of affective, ethical 
and aesthetic praxes that respond to and refract the multiple disconnections 
encouraged in the Cartesian moment and its privileging of the autonomous 
knowing subject (Hermeneutics, p26). Becoming, thereby, a refraction of the 
narcissistic neoliberal and plutonomic ‘truths’ that eat into our souls to amplify 
domination and unfreedom. 
 We are of course a long way from an ‘animist socialist’ conduct of conduct 
as a liberatory refraction of the modes of subjectification associated with 
neoliberal governmentality. This is a political moment in which white 
supremicism, plutonomy, kleptocracy and misogyny are (once again) 
shameless in their dominations of others, and environmental care is framed 
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simply as a constraint to economic growth and profiteering. It seems 
more urgent than ever to imagine and articulate different possibilities to 
counter-balance the destructive ‘truths’ legitimising current socioecological 
trajectories. For many of us concerned with the sustenance of both biological 
and cultural diversity, then, this is perhaps the moment of our lives when we 
most need the courage to activate, and enact, a different sort of truth. 
Sian Sullivan is Professor of Environment and Culture at Bath Spa University. 
She has published Political Ecology: Science, Myth and Power (2000), Contributions 
to Law, Philosophy and Ecology: Exploring Re-Embodiments (2016), and Valuing 
Development, Environment and Conservation: Creating Values that Matter (2018). 
Her recent articles appear in the Journal of Political Ecology, Science and 
Technology Studies, Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, Conservation 
Biology, Development and Change, Antipode and Ecosystem Services. Her current 
research deploys oral history to explore socio-ecological pasts and diversities 
in culturenature ontologies (see www.futurepasts.net).
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I am grateful to experiences in multiple contexts, to comments from Mike 
Hannis and two anonymous referees, and to the support of the UK’s Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AH/K005871/2), in the writing of this paper. 
